For the past few years, a strong rivalry between the San Francisco 49ers and the Seattle Seahawks has developed. For the most part, the rivalry has been back and forth as both teams have had success against one another. That being said, if there were to be some sort of “winner” in the rivalry at the moment, it would be Seattle. Seattle has found their success against San Francisco by shutting down one of the league’s most dynamic quarterbacks: Colin Kaepernick. If he is so dynamic, how did Seattle keep him from throwing a measly 152 yards per game? To be fair, it is not just the Seattle defense, nor is it just Kaepernick’s deficiencies. It is a combination of a handful of factors that come together to ultimately expose Kaepernick. Without further ado, lets dig into those factors.

The Numbers

SEA avg: 14/27 (51.9%), 152 yards, 0.6 TDs, 2 INTs

Non-SEA avg.: 15/26 (57.7%), 207 yards, 1.4 TDs, 0.3 INTs

@ SEA avg: 13.5/26 (52%), 140 yards, 1 TD, 2.5 INTs

@ Home vs SEA: 15/29 (51.7%), 175 yards, 1 TD, 1 INT

Disrupting Kaepernick Directly

Part of Kaepernick’s struggles are simple. Seattle’s defense is just very talented at every position. As if that alone is not enough to cause problem’s, Dan Quinn’s defensive scheming is wonderful. More often than not, Seattle only sends four players to rush the passer. Despite only rushing four, Seattle disrupts the pocket consistently, often forcing Kaepernick to either rush the throw or bail the pocket. Since Seattle is able to get consistent pressure by rushing only four players, that means that six players are able to drop back into coverage to cover what is often four receivers. But that math does not add up, I know. Four rushers plus six in coverage is only ten, but the eleventh player is key in shutting down Kaepernick.

This eleventh player is typically a spy (often K.J. Wright). For those who do not know, a spy shadows the quarterback around and makes sure that he does not escape the pocket. Seattle’s spy forced Kaepernick to stay in the pocket while the four rushers generate pressure and collapse the pocket. In theory, it is perfect, and for the most part, it was executed well. Although, the eleventh player is not always a spy.

While Seattle rarely blitzes a fifth rusher against Kaepernick, when they did so, it was often a defensive back as opposed to a linebacker. Of course some blitzes were from the linebackers, but Kam Chancellor and Walter Thurmond were asked to blitz from the edge for a decent percentage of Seattle’s blitzes against Kaepernick. While blitzing had its success, it also had a tendency to backfire as it allowed Kaepernick to run freely, which he often did in these situations. Considering Kaepernick is a scary athlete and Seattle can find success by only rushing four, it was clear as to why they tended to spy instead of blitz.

Taking Away Kaepernick’s Favorite Toys

In 2013, Anquan Boldin averaged four receptions per game against Seattle. In the remainder of the games in 2013, he averaged 5.5 receptions per game. Likewise, Vernon Davis averaged 2.3 receptions against Seattle as opposed to 3.1 receptions against other teams. Between the two, that is roughly 2.5 fewer receptions per game from star players. It may not sound dramatic, but fewer receptions on roughly the same amount of targets means that Seattle’s defensive backs are doing their job of keeping San Francisco’s most talented players at bay.

Although Frank Gore was not exactly a “toy” for Kaepernick, he was a key piece to the offenses success. In the three games in which San Francisco played Seattle, Seattle won two of them. In those two losses, Gore had a 30 yards on 20 carries. When San Francisco beat Seattle, Gore ran for 110 yards on only 17 carries. Now, the numbers can not be directly correlate to winning and losing, but Gore’s success made Kaepernick’s job easier. When Gore struggled, more responsibility was thrust upon Kaepernick’s shoulders and he was not ready to handle that sort of pressure. He gets too bold and goes for the “big” play in hopes that it will work and get San Francisco back in the game, but it often turned into a turnover.

Play Calling

Some call Greg Roman (San Francisco's offensive coordinator) a genius, some call him a moron. Realistically, he is a mixed bag of both, but more of the brilliancy comes from his running schemes. Roman had his moments in regards to passing schemes, but there were plenty of situations in which Roman’s call and concept was enough to screw Kaepernick.

Below, San Francisco only has three players run routes, but all of them run routes that are ten yards or deeper. There are a handful of issues with that. There was no safety valve for Kaepernick to check down to. Also, it was first down, they were in the red zone, and they had the lead. There was no reason to get overly aggressive. As if it were already awful enough, Seattle had done little blitzing all game, meaning that it was very likely for Seattle to have six or seven defenders covering only three receivers. Do the math. 

In that situation, Kaepernick’s only other options are either run, hope a defender (or multiple defenders) blow their assignment, or take a sack. Either way, it is a low percentage play with more negative outcomes than positive. The play, against Seattle especially, is designed for Kaepernick to fail.

Kaepernick's Own Deficiencies

Athletically, Kaepernick is a coach's dream. He is well built at 6'4" and 230 pounds and runs exceptionally well for that size. Kaepernick has the straight line speed to turn one bad angle from a safety into a touchdown. On top of that, Kaepernick has extraordinary arm strength. On paper, Kaepernick is a stud, but his actual play (at this stage in his career) says otherwise.

Kaepernick's vision is poor, especially when reading underneath. Most notably, he has trouble identifying poaching linebackers. Against Seattle, this is a major issue considering two or three linebackers drop back into coverage on almost every play. The handful of linebackers in coverage, often in zone, forces Kaepernick to understand exactly where routes are going to break and where his receivers will find room in between the zones. Unfortunately for San Francisco, this often leads to Kaepernick holding onto the ball for too long.

When Kaepernick holds the ball for too long, the pass rushers are able to collapse the pocket and force Kaepernick off of his spot, but Kaepernick's movement in the pocket is subpar. He has yet to learn how to maneuver the pocket in a way to more easily set up throwing lanes. Likewise, he tends to get a bit skittish when rushers get near him. Luckily for him, his athleticism alone allows him to escape. That said, his pocket movement as a whole is poor and restricts what Kaepernick can do as a passer.

As stated before, Kaepernick has a habit of getting too confident in his own ability and forgetting that the opposing 11 players are also professional football players. Below, Kaepernick bypasses any other read and throws right at Vernon Davis. Richard Sherman read Kaepernick like a book, got inside positioning on Davis, and caught an easy interception. There is no excuse for that kind of play. 

There is no doubt that Kaepernick is talented, but the Seahawks expose Kaepernick like no other team can. Their dominant play, brilliant scheme that contains Kaepernick, and Roman's play calling is a recipe for a Kaepernick disaster. Kaepernick's collective performance against Seattle in 2013 is simply unacceptable. Of course there is hope for him to play better against Seattle in 2014, but many of the factors, namely Quinn and Roman, will still be in the picture.